Sunday, October 4, 2009

What Lessons Should Georgians Draw From War Probe Findings?


October 02, 2009 By Salome ZurabishviliThe conclusions of the independent commission on the August 2008 war in Georgia, released in a report on September 30, should not only be noted by the European Union, which mandated the report, but should also give all parties grounds for serious thought.
The basic question of who was responsible for the conflict has long been answered. The leaders of both Russia and Georgia are at fault: the Russians for provoking rather than avoiding armed conflict, and then for overreacting, and the Georgian leader for launching a disastrous military attack and thus triggering what ended as a disaster for Georgia and for thousands of civilians.
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is personally responsible to his people for having launched the military aggression against Tskhinvali, and thereby giving Russia a free hand to enter, occupy, and formally recognize the independence of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
This judgment was passed by the vast majority of the Georgian people months before the commission led by diplomat Heidi Tagliavini made its conclusions public. The sentence was pronounced this spring, when for some 100 days hundreds of thousands of Georgians participated in repeated demonstrations to demand that Saakashvili resign and schedule early presidential elections.
A president who brought destruction on his country because of his misguided and willful decisions should answer for those actions and be held responsible. There will undoubtedly be further mass protests with the aim of forcing Saakashvili to comply with international norms and bow to the will of his people.
What has changed with the Tagliavini commission's findings is that this judgment has been legitimized and accepted by the international community; neither the Georgian president nor the Russian authorities are immune from blame and responsibility.
Time To Move Forward
As a democratic opposition leader, I think that our duty to both Georgian and international opinion is to confront this reality and try to move on from there.
If in the future we ever want to renew ties with the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whoever succeeds Saakashvili will have to address the consequences of his actions. We shall have to ask for forgiveness for the assault upon Tskhinvali. We, the opposition -- if we are given the responsibility for Georgia's destiny -- will have to face up to the fact that, albeit to a much lesser extent, we too bear responsibility for not having more effectively opposed Saakashvili's bellicose rhetoric and instincts.
For the Georgian opposition, this entails speaking the truth about the war without fear of being branded a "Russian fifth column" by government propaganda. Trying to portray any opposition movement as a Trojan horse acting in the interest of foreign foes is and will remain a hallmark of Saakashvili's rule. We should have understood by now that such allegations typify the deceptive nature of Saakashvili's style of government.
Acknowledging Russia's share of responsibility in infringing upon Georgia's sovereignty, we should also seek ways to end this confrontation and start to rebuild a new relationship based on harsh truth, rather than on demagogic lies on both sides.
Beyond our borders, our friends too have to reconcile themselves to the report's findings, which most of them already knew, but did not fully want to admit to. The first clear lesson is that while Saakashvili may cast himself as the strongest detractor of Vladimir Putin, that alone does not make him a better democrat, or a better candidate for preserving stability in a crucial region on Europe's distant borders.
In fact, the August war was, if anything, a war between autocrats. This war took place precisely because neither country applied democratic decision-making procedures before resorting to military force.
Clear Demands Needed
Since both regimes are still in place, another disaster is not out of the question. In order to prevent such a repetition and new confrontation and destabilization, Europe and the United States should make clear what they expect and require from the two perpetrators.
From Saakashvili, nothing less than real progress towards democracy should be demanded. This is also what the vast majority of the Georgian population has been demanding since the Rose Revolution of November 2003. The demonstrations which have regularly taken place since November 2007 testify to the Georgian people's yearning for genuine democratic rule.
Western governments should make their demands clear: media freedom, a truly independent judiciary, the protection of private property. But official promises should no longer be taken at face value: Western governments should impose strict conditions on any form of financial assistance.
From Russia, respect for existing agreements should be one of the conditions for a true "reset" of relations with the West. The question of the preexisting conflict zones and their return to Georgia is not one that can realistically be addressed at the present time. It should and will be discussed at some future date as one component of a global discussion of European security. Abkhazia and South Ossetia will return to Georgian control only as part of a grand bargain between Europe, Russia, and the United States.
The same does not hold true, however, of the two regions that were "forcibly occupied and annexed" during last summer's war and kept in violation of the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreements. Russia should be called on to return to the positions it occupied before August 7. The Akhalgori/Ksani and Liakhvi valleys on the South Ossetian side and the Kodori valley adjacent to Abkhazia are currently occupied in blatant violation of the agreement Moscow signed with the EU presidency. The Tagliavini report rightly points out that Kodori was not under Abkhaz control prior to that date, nor was the Georgian side responsible for launching the aggression there.
We in the Georgian democratic opposition do not for one moment doubt that Ambassador Tagliavini and her colleagues were inspired by the quest for truth and objectivity, and the desire to promote political stability and the rule of law. But their report will effectively serve peace and stability in the region only if we regard it as offering new dimensions to think about our common future. If we do not, it will remain no more than 1,000 pages of print that mask the EU's unwillingness to engage itself with greater determination, which by partially substantiating the one-sided arguments of both Russia and Georgia could trigger a renewed confrontation in the Caucasus.
We want that report to mark a new beginning for all conflict parties. Only then will the effort and expenditure that went into the report not have been in vain.
Salome Zurabishvili served from 2004-2005 as Georgia's foreign minister. She currently heads the opposition political party Georgia's Way. The views expressed in this commentary are her own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.

Friday, September 18, 2009

Sunshine Democrats by Salome Zourabichvili


09.17.2009

EMAIL ARTICLE | PRINTER FRIENDLY


The dilemma of the recent Afghan presidential election that is beguiling the West looks like a repetition to Georgian eyes.

In January 2008, we too had a very questionable presidential election. We too had a previously popular president—and yet he barely garnered 45 percent of the vote in the initial count, despite controlling all the administrative resources, and obvious and less-obvious frauds. We too had a situation where the opposition appeared less familiar and less predictable than the incumbent government. Like Afghanistan, Georgia witnessed the rise of corruption in the form of fraudulent votes, but it was said to be a benign local characteristic, not an illness that should be eradicated.

While Georgians voted, the mood in Washington was one of caution. Should America condemn Tbilisi’s poll and risk stability in the region for the sake of an ideal democracy? Especially one that might be out of reach for some time?

The answer in Georgia’s case was a blunt no. Before the votes were fully counted, the U.S. envoy congratulated the incumbent president, Mikheil Saakashvili, upon his reelection. The American head of a team of election observers followed suit, and Saakashvili’s final count went up to an unexpected 53 percent. For the Georgian opposition and public opinion alike, it meant that the game was over, despite demonstrations calling for a much-deserved second round election. There would not be a second chance for Georgian democracy.

Our Western partners, however, assumed stability in the Caucasus had been preserved, and that Georgia could have another try at democracy in its parliamentary elections the following spring. But both assumptions proved wrong. The region was thrown into chaos in August 2008, when Saakashvili walked into the Kremlin’s trap and fought a war with Russia over South Ossetia. Meanwhile, democratic freedoms were curbed throughout the country, making the outcome of the parliamentary election illegitimate. The opposition refused to take its seats, so as not to condone the mock vote.

A year and a half later, Georgia is a mess—with both permanent internal turmoil and permanent confrontation with its northern neighbor. Stability and democracy seem as far away as ever.

America should think hard on this lesson from the Caucasus and apply it to Afghanistan. Prematurely barring a second round between President Hamid Karzai and his primary challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, shows a lack of trust in the mechanisms of democracy. It prevents the political opposition from emerging as a credible alternative (which, not so incidentally, is the main criticism aimed at the Georgian opposition today). It also does little to convince the population that democracy is an effective means of governance. And it means a rising indifference and hostility to the very Western allies who preach democracy, but only up to a point—as they appear more concerned with protecting powerful friends than the promotion of the principles they claim to defend. Skepticism and cynicism of the electoral process are hardly feelings America should want to spread amongst the peoples of a nascent democracy.

Georgia went through this sordid process in the past year. Afghanistan shouldn’t have to. The lesson is clear—lasting peace and stability cannot come without democracy. Washington should be a firmer believer in the form of government it preaches, whether that be in Kabul or Tbilisi.



Salome Zourabichvili served as Georgia’s minister of foreign affairs from 2004–2005. She is now in the democratic opposition and is leader of The Way of Georgia political party.

Wednesday, August 12, 2009

Video








Salome Zourabichvili, former Georgian foreign minister and leader of The Way of Georgia party on the choice facing Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili after the visit of US Vice President Joe Biden


http://georgiamediacentre.com/

Tuesday, August 11, 2009

The Saakashvili paradox

The Saakashvili paradox

Your View, August 10th 2009, 9:00 pm

This is a guest post by Salomé Zourabichvili

A year ago, Georgia was the place where for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian troops marched into an independent country. They demonstrated to the world that Russia had recovered power and the will to exert it. And for a few days, the world was wondering where the Russian army would stop.

A year ago, Georgia was the first place where the EU, through its acting president, Mr Sarkozy, managed to broker a cease fire that, despite its many flaws, still holds now. The EU demonstrated that peace in Europe was a concept worth defending and where the EU could make a difference.

A year ago, the United States, represented by an outgoing administration, reacted relatively passively, allowing European nations to take the lead in facilitating the dialogue between Georgia and Russia. The question is whether our European friends and allies will take a lead in rebuilding Georgia’s shattered democracy one year on.

A year ago, President Saakashvili managed after 6 months of protests, demonstrations and disputed elections to shut out the opposition claiming that the defence of Georgian independence was at stake. Georgia lost a fifth of her territories and suffered an economic collapse but the regime managed to cling to power.

What has changed today? In appearance nothing; tension is back at the border, daily provocations might trigger an escalation; now as then, nobody knows to which side to attribute the responsibility of this confrontation; and again the question arises: could a new war erupt in the heat of summer in this remote part of Europe?

However, despite appearances, many things have changed: the relationship between the US and Russia is no longer compared to the cold war as it was at the end of the Bush administration. The Obama factor has produced some effect already - the Russians know that they have more to gain from the “Restart” button than they would from a new conflict. His Moscow visit has not solved things, but it has raised possibilities that neither side would want to shatter yet.

The Russians have got all they wanted and maybe more: the borders have moved deep into Georgian territory making their leverage even more pregnant. They have recognised the separatist entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and have thus used the ultimate threat against Georgia. It is less probable that they would like to conquer more Georgian territory and have to occupy a hostile and fiercely independent country. They would have more on their hands as they cannot decide what to do with those “very new” independent states that nobody wants to recognise and that they are unable either to totally absorb or to relinquish.

As for the idea that Prime Minister Putin or President Medvedev might go to war in order to finish the job and get rid of President Saakashvili, it is an argument for Saakashvili, by Saakashvili.

The reality is different, for there is a “Saakashvili paradox” that reads as follows: having lost much of his legitimacy within and most of his international credit outside, he is the Georgian leader the Russians hate most, but also their best objective ally.

He has managed to give Russia everything they want: NATO membership for Georgia has moved from a feasible project to a distant possibility; 20% of our territories have been lost and seem for many to be lost for ever. The Georgian economy has, through an opaque privatisation process, been transferred mostly to Russian hands and western investment is more of a myth than a reality. Finally, as Freedom House and others have demonstrated Georgia has moved from the promising democracy of the Rose Revolution to an increasingly authoritarian state that can no longer exert a positive role model on Russia.

Ironically, President Saakashvili is the most helpful leader the Kremlin could wish for.

For the President, the threat of war is the last resort to raise European interest and American support for ‘small Georgia’ by making it appear as a victim of its big and imperial neighbour, while hiding the failures of its democratic process.

The threat of war is one of the last cards that an illegitimate regime can use to force the opposition to a demonstration of national unity and get a temporary popularity boost.

The prospect of war can be handy for Russia too. President Medvedev could be tempted to deliver nationalist propaganda to a population that is going through a deep economic and social crisis.

Now, unlike a year ago, there is no rationale for a war; for it cannot achieve any of the real objectives of either country. But now as then, two undemocratic regimes can use mutual belligerence for political profit.

Of the two, Georgia pretends to be democratic. It wants to be considered as a part of the European family. But it should be made clear to President Saakashvili that time has come to stop playing with fire and blackmailing friends. Time has come to deliver a pluralistic, open government as the only guarantee of peace and stability. Our best defence against Russia is democracy.

When Vice President Biden visited Tbilisi last month he set several tests for the regime to realise the democratic ideals of the Rose revolution – from media freedom to the rule of law.

But just days ago, some opposition supporters were kidnapped, beaten and shot with plastic bullets in a horrific attack. They are certain it was because of their political views. It was carried out by men driving in a vehicle belonging to the police. The lack of a credible investigation raises suspicions as to whether it was carried out on the orders of the government.

This is just the most recent example of the human rights abuses by the regime, despite the promises of a “new wave of democracy” by our President. Keeping the pressure on Mr Saakashvili to reform will require support and pressure from all our allies – in the United States and Europe - just as they supported us a year ago.

Salomé Zourabichvili is a Former Foreign Minister of Georgia and leader of the pro-European opposition party “The Way of Georgia” Her party’s website is at http://thewayofgeorgia.org but those who cannot read Georgian can see Georgian opposition content at http://georgiamediacentre.com







Thursday, August 6, 2009

Le Parisien



« Saakachvili joue avec le feu »


SALOME ZOURABICHVILI, ex-ministre géorgienne des Affaires étrangères

Ancienne ambassadrice de France a Tbilissi, puis ministre des Affaires étrangères de Géorgie, Salomé Zourabichvili, qui est aujourd’hui dans l’opposition, vient de publier un
livre* où elle analyse les relations de son pays avec Moscou.

Y a-t-il de réels risques d’une nouvelle guerre entre la Russie et la Géorgie?

Salomé Zourabichvili.
Nous sommes en présence de deux Etats qui sont aussi peu démocratiques l’un que l’autre, mais qui ont tout intérêt à fairemonter lamayonnaise, pour des raisons de politique intérieure. D’un côté, Medvedev et Poutine sont toujours friands de montrer la force retrouvée de leur pays. De l’autre, Saakachvili peut rechercher dans la fuite en avant lemoyen de redorer son blason vis-à-vis des Géorgiens car, confronté depuis le 9 avril à cent jours de manifestations de l’opposition, il sait qu’il va avoir une rentrée difficile. La Russie, toutefois, n’a pas d’intérêt rationnel à redémarrer une guerre un an après avoir obtenu la sécession de l’Abkhazie et de l’Ossétie du Sud. Mais l’irrationnel n’est jamais très loin dans cette région du Caucase…
Entre Moscou et Tbilissi, le ton monte…
Nous assistons peut-être au scénario inverse de celui de l’été dernier, où des provocations
russes avaient acculé Saakachvili à la faute. Cette fois-ci, les provocations seraient plutôt
géorgiennes. En poussant la Russie à intervenir, Saakachvili — qui joue avec le feu —redeviendrait une victime et pourrait remobiliser les Géorgiens derrière lui et faire taire l’opposition.
Pourquoi la Russie accuse-t-elle les Etats-Unis de réarmer la Géorgie ?
Je crois qu’il s’agit de manoeuvres politiques car ces accusations ne semblent pas tenir la route. Le vice-président américain, Joe Biden, est certes venu récemment à Tbilissi réaffirmer le soutien américain à l’indépendance de la Géorgie, assurer que le rapprochement avecMoscou ne se ferait pas sur le dos de laGéorgie et fixer à la Russie la ligne rouge à ne pas dépasser, mais il n’est pas venu apporter des armes ni même en promettre. LesAméricains n’ontpaspris leurs distances visà- vis de laGéorgie,mais ils les ont prises à l’égard du régime. Saakachvili sait parfaitement qu’avec Obama il n’a plus le même soutien qu’avec Bush.

Propos recueillis par Bruno Fanucchi
« La Tragédie géorgienne », de Salomé
Zourabichvili, Ed. Grasset, 332 pages, 18 [1].

06.08.2009